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 Abstract 
 
Share repurchases have become a popular payout method to distribute cash flows to 
shareholders not only in the U.S. but also other countries. This study examines the firms’ 
share price and operating performance surrounding actual share repurchases and the 
motivations behind share repurchases in the Hong Kong stock market. The empirical results 
show that, on average, firms engage in share repurchases when their stocks are under-valued 
and repurchases are followed by abnormal positive returns. Among repurchases, the stock 
price performance varies across firms’ size and market-to-book ratios. The market responds 
most favourably to repurchases that are made by small and “value” firms. This suggests that 
smaller firms are usually less analysed and more likely to be undervalued, hence the market 
reacts more favourably when they repurchase. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Share repurchases have become a popular payout method to distribute cash flows to 
shareholders, not only in the U.S. but also other countries. During 1996 -1998, U.S. firms 
announced the repurchase of roughly $550 billion worth of stock, while in the first half of 
2000 alone, 375 repurchase programs were announced with a total value of $85 billion. In 
Canada, the number of firms buying back their stock increased from 106 in 1989 to 172 in 
1997, and if all the repurchase programs were fully completed they would amount to $C35.6 
billion. (Ikenberry et al., 2000). In Australia, the number of repurchase programs announced 
increased from 67 for the period  1990-1995 (Mitchell and Robinson, 1999) to 227 for the 
period 1996-2000 (Lamba and Luan, 2004). There is an increasing movement in the world 
stock market towards adopting share repurchase activities and deregulations have encouraged 
firms to use share repurchases as an alternative to dividends (Sabri, 2003). In the U.S., share 
repurchases have grown at a higher rate than cash dividends since 1980, especially during 
1995 - 1998, where share repurchases have grown on an average of 26 percent per year while 
dividends grew at 11 percent (Weston and Siu, 2002). 
  
There are many reasons why firms buyback their own shares. In general, firms repurchase to 
take advantage of potential undervaluation, distribute excess capital, alter leverage ratios, 
fend off takeovers and counter the dilution effects of stock options (Dittmar, 2000).  
Furthermore, researches have shown that stock repurchases typically lead to an increase in 
share prices (Choi and Park, 1997; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Born et al., 2004) and an 
improvement in firms’ operating performance (Nohel and Tarhan, 1998; Lamba and Luan, 
2004). 
 
There is a substantial amount of research on share repurchase using datasets in the U.S. 
However research outside the U.S. is still limited, especially in the Hong Kong market. 
Results from the U.S. and other countries cannot be applied to the Hong Kong market due to 
the differences in disclosure requirements, the regulatory environment and investors’ 
perceptions. Furthermore, most of those studies are based on repurchase announcements not 
the actual repurchases. Hence, there is little evidence as to the operating and market 
performance in which repurchases actually occurred. Firms in Hong Kong were permitted to 
repurchase their own shares after the amendments of the Companies Ordinance in 1991. The 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) has a unique disclosure requirement for share 
repurchases. Any share repurchase on a given day must be reported to the exchange not later 
than 30 minutes before the trading start on the following business day. The exchange will 
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then immediately release the information to the media. This means that the previous day’s 
share repurchase activities (i.e. share price, volume etc.) are fully disclosed to the public 
before the opening of the stock trading.  
 
This study examines the firms’ share price and operating performance surrounding actual 
share repurchases and the motivations behind share repurchases in the Hong Kong stock 
market.  The unique disclosure environment of SEHK allowed us to investigate the impact on 
firms’ stock price and operating performance following the actual repurchases. Further, there 
is little evidence as to the operating and market performance in which repurchases actually 
occurred. The rest of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
relevant literature and addresses the research questions of this study. Section 3 describes the 
data and research methodology and section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Previous literature has documented positive market response and improvement in the firms’ 
operating performance following share repurchases. The impact of repurchase on share price 
comes from the changes in a company’s capital structure, the signals a repurchase sends and 
the use of excess cash in buying back shares instead of spending it on unprofitable investment. 
With regard to the explanation for changes in stock prices and firms’ performance, the most 
often mentioned reasons for repurchasing stock include several prominent hypotheses, such 
as the information signalling/undervaluation hypothesis, the free cash flow hypothesis and the 
leverage hypothesis. 
 
2.1 The Information Signalling/Undervaluation Hypothesis 
 
Positive market reactions have most often been attributed to the information signalling 
hypothesis. The information signalling hypothesis was first introduced by Vermaelen (1981) 
in the study of share repurchases. The hypothesis implies that not all market participants have 
the same information. Managers are sometimes better informed than investors. When 
managers have favourable information about the firms’ future prospects, the share prices 
cannot reflect this information because investors only have access to public information. 
Managers then reveal the information about their stock prices that are undervalued in the 
market through announcing share repurchases (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). There are two 
forms of the signalling hypothesis. This includes the “earnings signalling” hypothesis, which 
suggests that firms repurchase to convey the management’s expectation of their future 
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improvement in the earnings performance.  The other signalling is the “undervaluation” 
hypothesis which implies that firms repurchase to express their disagreement with the way 
the market is pricing existing public information (Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003).  Further, 
Baker et al. (2003) survey of the top financial executives of the U.S. firms shows that the 
second most highly cited reason for repurchasing in the open market is to acquire stock at a 
bargain price. 
 
Empirical evidence has shown that repurchases are preceded by relatively poor performance 
and followed by an increase in stock prices. In the U.S., Ikenberry et al (1995) found negative 
returns in prior announcement, which meant that these firms were undervalued at the time of 
the announcement of the repurchase program. Event announcement returns for a 5-day 
window were 3.54 percent and a 4-year return of 12.14 percent. For ‘value’ (relatively 
undervalued) stocks, where companies were more likely to repurchase shares because of 
undervaluation, the 4-year return was 45.29 percent. No positive abnormal return was 
observed for ‘glamour’ stocks. In Canada, Ikenberry et al (2000) and Li and McNally (2003) 
found evidence of poor performance prior to announcements and significant increases in 
price following the announcements. The poor pre-announcement performance and subsequent 
out-performance showed that undervaluation is a motivation for stock repurchases. Among 
the repurchasing firms, small firms were found to receive higher announcement period 
returns. The result is consistent with the signalling hypothesis that small firms are more likely 
to suffer from greater asymmetric information. When they repurchase, they signal more 
information than large firms, thus generating greater abnormal returns. 
 
2.2 Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
 
Free cash flow (FCF) is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have 
positive net present values. The free cash flow hypothesis is based on Jensen’s (1986) study 
which analysed the conflict between managers and shareholders when companies have large 
amount of excess cash with no available profitable investment opportunities. These 
companies are at risk of over-investing or investing in non-profitable projects. One way to 
overcome this problem is to return cash back to shareholders in the form of dividends or 
share repurchases. Repurchases force the firms to reduce the excess of cash that might 
otherwise be invested in non-profitable projects. This reduces the resources under managers’ 
control, and thus reduces the cost arising from the conflict between managers and 
shareholders—the agency cost of “free cash flow”. The free cash flow hypothesis suggests 
that repurchases are likely to be good news because they reduce management’s ability to 
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divert capital to uses that are not in the best interest of shareholders (Grullon and Ikenberry, 
2000). Share repurchases are meant to reduce the firm’s surplus cash and such reduction 
increases shareholder wealth (Choi and Park, 1997).  
 
Nohel and Tarhan (1998) examined the operating performance and returns of firms 
announcing tender offer share repurchases. The authors used the Tobin’s q  ratio to determine 
a group of over-investing firms. They found a significant abnormal return of 7.6 percent for 
low growth firms (low-q) in the 3-day period surrounding the announcement of the 
repurchase, while there was no improvement for high-q firms. Furthermore, the authors also 
found evidence of a significant improvement in the performance of low growth repurchasing 
firms following the repurchase, while there was no improvement for high growth firms. The 
performance gains of low growth firms were generated by their ability to significantly 
improve their asset utilization (turnover) by selling off assets in non-profitable projects and 
distributing the excess cash. The authors concluded that the positive investor reaction to 
repurchases was best explained by the free cash flow hypothesis. 
 
Grullon and Michaely (2003) found that repurchasing firms reduced their capital 
expenditures and research and development (R&D) during the year of repurchase. 
Furthermore, repurchasing firms significantly reduced their cash reserves over three years 
after repurchase announcements. These findings support the free cash flow hypothesis that 
firms which have been experiencing a contraction in their investment opportunity are more 
likely to pay out cash in the form of repurchases. In addition, the evidence suggests that the 
positive market reaction to repurchase announcements is due to the reduction in free cash 
flows and the reaction is stronger among those firms that are more likely to over-invest. Thus, 
the reduction in agency conflicts of overinvestment could explain why the market responds 
positively to repurchases. 
 
2.3 The Leverage Hypothesis 
 
Another common motive for repurchasing is to alter the firm’s capital structure or increase 
the firm’s leverage. Young (1969) proposed that share repurchase is a means of increasing 
the firm’s financial leverage and thereby allows the firm to benefit from the tax advantages of 
debt financing. The author found that repurchasing firms had a lower leverage position than 
non-repurchasing firms and the repurchasing firms had greater ability to carry additional debt. 
For the repurchasing firms, with the increase in financial leverage, they can benefit from the 
tax saving of debt financing. The cost of capital is lower when a company uses some debt for 
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financing repurchase because interest payments are tax deductible while dividends are not. 
Holding excess cash raises the cost of capital because income from interest earned from the 
cash is taxable. In general, having too much cash on hand penalizes a company by increasing 
its cost of financing and puts investors in a disadvantageous situation (Dobbs and Rehm, 
2005). Mintz (1995) presented evidence that the 20 largest share repurchases in 1995 allowed 
firms to benefit from tax savings of a market value of $9.5 billion. Guffey and Schneider 
(2004) showed that the firms engaging in open market repurchase were less indebted and they 
repurchase to adjust leverage. 
 
Share repurchases have become a popular corporate payout method, not only in the U.S., but 
also in many countries around the world. However, research on share repurchases outside the 
U.S. is still limited.  For example, Lamba and Luan (2004) examined the long-run operating 
performance of firms announcing open market share repurchase in Australia during 1996-
2000. The authors found that open market share repurchase had a significant and positive 
long-run impact on the firms’ operating performance. Their results implied that the firms 
used share repurchase to signal their favourable information to the market, distribute excess 
cash to shareholders in order to minimize the agency problem and to improve the long-term 
financial leverage. 
 
In an empirical study of share repurchases in Europe, Lasfer (2000) showed that out of 642 
announcements over the 1985-1998 period, 465 or 72 percent of the announcements were 
made in the U.K. The study investigated the share price behaviour around the announcement 
of the intention to repurchase ordinary shares by the U.K. and other European firms. The 
study tested the signalling hypothesis under different institutional factors and highlighted the 
extent to which the factors affected the short and medium-term market reaction to share 
repurchases. The author found a positive market reaction to repurchase announcements. On 
the announcement date, share prices increased by 1.64 percent in the U.K. and 1.06 percent in 
Europe.  
 
Wada (2005) analysed the stock performance of all the Japanese firms around their share 
repurchase announcements between 1995 and 2001. The author found that firms on average 
repurchased 74 percent of the number of shares they originally announced they were 
repurchasing. The finding is similar to that of Stephens and Weisbach (1998) who concluded 
that firms on average acquire only 74 to 82 percent of shares targeted within three years of 
the repurchase announcement.  
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 Jung et al (2003) examined the stock repurchases in Korea. The authors showed that firms 
that announced open market repurchases demonstrated very poor performance prior to 
announcement (-8.39 percent) while firms that announced stock stabilization funds 
demonstrated very little abnormal performance before the announcement (-0.05 percent).  
Chen et al (2003) examined the announcement effects in the first year of the Taiwan’s open 
market share repurchases. Their findings suggest that the announcing firms’ shares seemed to 
experience poor performance over the period preceding the announcement and had a 
significantly abnormal performance over the announcement period.  Zhang (2002) 
investigated the share price performance surrounding, and after actual open market share 
repurchases using the data from Hong Kong. The author suggests that firms tended to 
repurchase shares when their stocks were relatively under-performing in the market. 
Furthermore there is no evidence of abnormal returns after the actual repurchases, which 
suggests that public investors, on average, cannot profit from buying these stocks even if they 
act immediately after the repurchase news appears in the newspaper or on the Teletext system. 
The author concluded that the average short-term market response to actual repurchases is not 
particularly significant when compared to average bid-ask spread in Hong Kong. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
 
Daily open market repurchase activities, i.e. the name of the repurchasing firm, the day of 
repurchase, the number of shares repurchased and the daily total paid for repurchased shares 
were obtained from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong’s Share Repurchase Report (SRR). In 
Hong Kong, almost all share repurchases are conducted via the exchange. Thus, this study 
focused on the repurchase of the ordinary shares that are traded on the exchange. Other types 
of securities such as warrants and other methods of repurchase such as general offer were 
excluded from this study. 
 
The sample comprised all open market share repurchases traded on the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong (SEHK) from the period of 27 November 1991 to 31 December 2001. The 
sample set excluded the repurchases made following the stock market crash in the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. During the Asian financial crisis, SEHK-listed firms repurchased unusually 
large quantities of their own shares in response to their low post-crash share prices (see 
Brockman and Chung, 2001). “Including them would lead to time-clustering problems 
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because market-wide shocks affect all these observations in the same way” (Stephens and 
Weisbach, 1998, p317). The Hang Seng Index was very volatile over the 13 months (Oct 
1997 – Oct 1998) and the average of repurchases was 191 per month during the crisis period 
compared to 63 per month during the pre-crisis period (Brockman and Chung, 2001). This 
study excluded the repurchases made from October 1997 to October 1998. The final sample 
covered 109 months (November 1991 to September 1997 and November 1998 to December 
2001).  Daily share prices and the market index were collected from DataStream. Hang Seng 
Index were used as the market index in this study.   
 
This study uses the technique that similar to Zhang (2002) in defining the event day. If we 
considered every repurchase day as an event day, then we ran the risk that firms which made 
frequent repurchases would have undue weighting in our sample portfolio returns. However, 
if we took the first repurchase of each firm as the event day, then much useful repurchase 
information would be disregarded. Therefore, we defined the first repurchase day in a month 
as an event when a firm made multiple repurchases within a month (Zhang, 2002). The total 
sample was then categorised according to industry, firm size and market-to-book ratio. 
 
3.1.1 Industry 
 
Born et al. (2004) suggested that the industry of a repurchasing firm might influence the 
market response to share repurchases. The authors studied the stock repurchase program in 
the insurance industry and found a positive abnormal return during and after repurchase 
announcement. The effect however was smaller compared to that in the industrial firms. The 
authors concluded that the regulation and monitoring in the insurance industry reduced the 
degree of information asymmetry, which reduced the information content of the stock 
repurchase in the insurance industry, resulting in a relatively smaller abnormal return. 
Therefore, this study examined the relationship between industry and the market reaction to 
the share repurchases. The industries of the sample firms were obtained from the Datastream. 
Repurchasing firms were grouped into 33 different industries as identified in the Datastream.  
 
3.1.2 Firm Size 
 
Firm size is used as a proxy for information asymmetry in several studies on share 
repurchases, see for example Dittmar (2000), Zhang (2002) and Hackethal and Zdantchouk 
(2004). According to Vermaelen’s signalling hypothesis, smaller firms suffer from greater 
information asymmetry because they are less covered by analysts and have less information 
available publicly. Thus, small firms are more likely to be mis-valued and more likely to 
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repurchase stock. Hence, the market is likely to react more favourably to repurchases that are 
made by smaller firms. Both Zhang (2002) and Hackethal and Zdantchouk (2004) found 
evidence that the market reacts more favourably to relatively small firms in the post-
repurchase period and the returns decrease across size quartiles. 
 
In this study, firm size was measured by the market capitalization obtained by multiplying 
share prices by the number of outstanding shares of the firm. Firms were then divided into 
groups based on their market capitalization. 
 
3.1.3 Market to Book Ratio 
 
The signalling/ undervaluation hypothesis implies that firms with low market-to-book ratio 
are more likely to repurchase. Previous studies found evidence that the market reacts more 
favourably to ‘value’ stocks and the abnormal returns are negatively correlated with firms’ 
market-to-book ratios. For example, Ikenberry et al (1995) found a 4-year positive return of 
45.29 percent for ‘value’ stocks and no positive abnormal return for ‘glamour’ stocks. Zhang 
(2002) found a positive initial market reaction and a short-term abnormal return for ‘value’ 
stocks and a negative return for ‘glamour’ stocks in Hong Kong. Thus, market-to-book ratio 
(MTBR) may indicate a firm’s potential for undervaluation. 
  
The sample firms were divided into sub-samples according to their MTBR. In this research, 
MTBR is defined as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. 
 
3.1.4 Daily Share Price and Market Index 
 
Daily share prices and the market index were collected from DataStream. In this study, the 
adjusted closing daily share price was used to calculate the daily stock returns. The proxy for 
the market was the Hang Seng Index. The Hang Seng Index (HSI) is a capitalization-
weighted stock market index in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, which was started on 24 
November 1969. It is compiled and maintained by HSI Services Limited, which is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Hang Seng Bank, the second largest bank listed in Hong Kong in terms 
of market capitalization. It is made up of the 33 largest companies of the Hong Kong stock 
market and is used as the main indicator of the overall market performance in Hong Kong. 
These companies represent about 70 percent of capitalization of the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange.  
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3.1.5 Control Firms 
 
To examine the operating performance, it was necessary to develop a benchmark to show 
how differently repurchasing firms perform compared to non-repurchasing firms. Barber and 
Lyon (1996) suggested that to detect abnormal performance following an event, sample firms 
should be compared with control firms based on their industry and the size of the firm one 
year before the event. This research used the size-matched procedure suggested by Barber 
and Lyon (1996), which includes: 
 
1. Identifying all firms in the same industry with the repurchasing firm. 
2. Filtering the firms that had between 70 percent to 130 percent size of the 
sample firm.  
3. Choosing the firm with the market to book ratio (MBR) that was closest to that 
of sample firm.  
 
Only firms that did not announce share repurchase during 1991-2001 were retained as 
potential control sample candidates. 
 
3.2 Estimation and Event Windows 
 
Event study methodology is one of the most frequently used analytical tools in financial 
research to assess whether there are any abnormal or excess returns earned by security 
holders accompanying specific events (Peterson, 1989). Event study was introduced by Fama 
et al. (1969) who examines the effect of the announcement of a stock split on stock prices. 
 
Normal returns, or normal stock price performance for a security, are returns which are 
expected to be observed if no event occurs. These normal returns are estimated over a time 
period prior to share repurchases. Typical lengths of the estimation period range from 100 to 
300 days for daily stock returns studies (Peterson, 1989). The estimation window in this study 
comprised 150 trading days, from 170 trading days before (-170) to 21 trading days before (-
21) the event day (0).   
 
Typical lengths of the event period range from 21 to 121 days for daily stock returns studies 
(Peterson, 1989). Zhang (2002) used a window of 20 days prior to, and after the actual 
buyback event to estimate the share repurchases in the Hong Kong market. The pre-event 
stock price performance is intended to identify whether firms buyback their shares when their 
stocks are relatively under-performing in the market, while the post-event stock price 
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performance is designed to capture the market reaction to actual share repurchases. To 
examine the short-term price performance surrounding the actual share repurchases, an event 
window of 41 trading days, that is from 20 trading days before (-20) to 20 trading days after 
(+20) the event day (0), was used in this study. This period is approximately equivalent to 
one calendar month before and after the event day.  Hence, daily return data was collected for 
191 trading days from day -170 to day +20. The returns for days -170 to -21 were to be used 
in the estimation period while the returns for days -20 to +20 were to be used in the event 
period. 
 
4. Empirical Model 
 
The market model estimates the relationship between a share’s returns and returns on the 
market by ordinary least squares (OLS) and uses this relationship to estimate the expected 
returns, given returns on the market.1  
 
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=      (1) 
 
where  = Log return for security i on day t; itR
   = Log return for Hang Seng index on day t; mtR
  iα  = The market model intercept term for security i; 
  iβ  = The market model slope for security i; 
  itε  = A random error term for security i on day t 
 
To examine the market response to share repurchase required a measure of the abnormal 
return. Abnormal return is the actual return of the security after share repurchase minus the 
expected return without the repurchase. The abnormal return for firm i on day t (through 
event window) was calculated as follows: 
 ( )mtiiitit RRAR βα +−=     (2) 
 
where  = Abnormal return on security i on day t; itAR
   = Log return on security i on day t (actual return); itR
iα  = The market model intercept term for security i from  
  equation (1); 
 iβ  = The market model slope for security i from equation  
   (1); 
   = Log return on Hang Seng index on day t; mtR
                                                 
1 All returns computed are transformed into log-form to stabilize the variance of the error terms and allows the 
approximation of the error terms toward a symmetric distribution. 
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  ( )mtii Rβα +  = Expected return without the repurchase. 
 
In order to draw overall inferences for the repurchase, the abnormal returns (equation 2) were 
then aggregated through time i.e. event window.   
 
( ) ∑
=
= 2
1
21 ,
t
tt
iti ARttCAR    (3) 
 
where   = cumulative abnormal returns from t( 21 , ttCARi ) 1 to t2; 
 
We examined cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a three windows period, CAR(-20,-
1), CAR(0,+2) and CAR(+1,+20). CAR(-20,-1) was designed to investigate the stock price 
performance prior to repurchase. CAR(0,+2) was designed to capture the initial market 
reaction to actual share repurchase. CAR(+1,+20) was designed to investigate whether public 
investors can make any abnormal profits if they act immediately after they learn the disclosed 
actual share repurchase information (Zhang, 2002). 
 
In order to examine the changes and impacts on firms’ operating performance measures, we 
defined the first repurchase day in a year as an event when a firm made multiple repurchases 
within a year. This was because operating performance measures are mostly available from 
the financial statement on an annual basis. 
 
To examine the operating performance, it was necessary to develop a benchmark to show 
how differently repurchasing firms perform compared to non-repurchasing firms. This 
research used the size-matched procedure suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996), which 
includes: 
• Identifying all firms in the same industry with the repurchasing firm 
• Filtering the firms that had between 70 percent to 130 percent size of the sample firm.  
• Choosing the firm with the market to book ratio (MBR) that was closest to that of 
sample firm.  
 
Operating performance variables used in this study were based on Lamba and Luan’s (2004) 
study, and included: 
• Operating cash flow ratio (OCFR): Operating cash flow ratio is measured as the ratio of 
the operating cash flows to total current liabilities. OCFR is used to measure a firm’s 
ability to pay its short-term liabilities.  
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• Leverage ratio (LEV): Leverage ratio is defined as the book value of long-term debt 
divided by the sum of the total net worth and long-term debt.  
• Return on assets (ROA): Return on assets is defined as operating income before 
abnormal items and taxes divided by book value of total assets.  
• Asset turnover (ATURN): Asset turnover is defined as total sales divided by the book 
value of operating assets at the beginning of the year.  
• Capital expenditure ratio (CAPEX): Capital expenditure ratio is defined as total capital 
expenditure divided by the book value of total assets at the beginning of the year.  
 
The operating performance variables were analyzed over three years before and after the 
repurchase year. In addition, the ‘paired differences’2 of these ratios were also computed to 
show the abnormal performance of repurchasing firms.  
 
The univariate regression of the post-repurchase values on the pre-repurchase values: 
 
iii PREBUYPOSTBUY εφδ ++=     (4) 
 
where POSTBUY represents the paired difference of median post-repurchase value of a 
variable and PREBUY represents the paired difference of median pre-repurchase values of a 
variable. The pre-repurchase covers years -3 through -1 and the post-repurchase period 
covers years +1 through +3, where year 0 is the year of repurchase. The intercept, iδ  is a 
constant term that captures the impact of the repurchase on operating performance, while the 
slope coefficient, iφ  captures the possible trend from the pre-repurchase to post-repurchase 
periods. (see Nohel and Tarhan, 1998; Lamba and Luan, 2004). 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents the summary of statistics for open market share repurchase activities in 
Hong Kong during the sample period. During the sample period, 367 companies paid about 
HK$18.6 billion and bought back about 6.5 billion shares. The 367 firms made 9512 daily 
repurchases. Using only the first repurchase day as an event when a firm made multiple 
repurchases within a month, there were a total of 2046 repurchase events during the sample 
period.  
                                                 
2 Paired difference is computed as the value for the sample firm minus the value of the corresponding control 
sample firm 
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 Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for open market share repurchases activities from 
1991 to 2001. It shows the number of firms engaged in repurchase, total number of daily 
repurchases, number of repurchase events, total shares repurchased and the total value of 
repurchases. For convenience, the total number of shares repurchased and the total value of 
repurchases are presented in Figure 1. Both table and figure show that share repurchase has 
been increasingly popular as a payout method since it was first introduced in Hong Kong in 
1991. The total value of share repurchases reached HK$4.9 billion in 2001 compared to 
HK$54 million in 1991. 
 
5.2 Share Price Response to Actual Share Repurchases 
(Full Sample) 
 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the full sample abnormal stock price performances surrounding 
the actual repurchases. On average, there was a negative abnormal return before share 
repurchases. The mean CAR (-20, -1) value for all the repurchasing firms was -0.87 percent. 
This suggests that firms tended to repurchase when their stocks were relatively under-
performing in the market. The 3 days cumulative abnormal return CAR (0, 2) was 0.40 
percent and the 20-day return CAR (1, 20) was 0.88 percent. These indicate that the market 
responded positively to actual repurchases. 
 
5.2.1 Firm Size 
 
The cumulative abnormal return by size quartile is presented in Panel B of Table 3. The panel 
shows a consistent pattern, on average, firms of all sizes experienced negative stock return 
before repurchases and gained positive return after repurchases. It clearly shows that smaller 
firms have higher abnormal returns in the post repurchase period (1, 20), while the abnormal 
return declined across size quartiles. For the smallest quartile firms (quartile 1), the CAR (1, 
20) was 2.25 percent and was statistically significant at the one percent level. One-way 
ANOVA was used to test whether the size of repurchasing firms had any impact on the stock 
returns. The F-test shows that only the CAR (1, 20) was statistically significant at the one 
percent level. This result supports the Vermaelen’s signalling hypothesis that small firms are 
more likely to be under-valued and the market is likely to react more favorably to repurchases 
made by smaller firms. These findings are consistent with those of Zhang (2002) and 
Hackethal and Zdantchouk (2004) who found that post-repurchase return decreased across 
size quartiles.    
 
13 
5.2.2 Market to Book Ratio 
 
Panel C in Table 3 presents the abnormal returns across MTBR quartiles. It shows that all 
firms repurchase when their stocks have under-performed in the market. The panel also 
shows a clear pattern that CAR (0, 2) and CAR (1, 20) decreased across MTBR quartiles. The 
initial market reaction CAR (0, 2) for the value stocks (quartile 1) was 0.93 percent and was 
significantly different from zero, while it was 0.06 percent for glamour stocks (quartile 4).  
The 20-day return after repurchase CAR (1, 20) was 2.92 percent for value stocks and was 
significant at the one percent level, while it was -0.5 percent for glamour stocks. The F-test 
showed that the CAR (1, 20) was statistically significant which indicates that the market 
reacts more favorably to stocks that are relatively under-valued (value stocks).    
 
5.2.3 Industry 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the market reaction when firms are disaggregated based on 
their industry. It shows an inconsistent pattern, only a few of the abnormal returns are 
statistically significant. Overall, the F-test showed that the mean returns in three event 
windows were not significantly different from zero.  This indicates that industry might not be 
an explanatory variable for market response to share repurchases in the Hong Kong market.  
 
5.3 Repurchasing Firms’ Operating Performance Measures  
 
5.3.1 Time Series Behavior of Operating Performance Measures 
 
Table 5 describes the time series behavior of the operating performance measures for the 
repurchasing firms. the return on assets (ROA) decreased from the pre- to post-repurchase 
periods, from 6.89 percent in year -3 to 2.4 percent in year +3. The decline in return on assets 
was inconsistent with the earning signalling hypothesis which states that firms buyback their 
share to convey the management’s expectation of their future improvement in earnings 
performance. There was a decrease in capital expenditure (CAPEX) from the pre- to post-
repurchase periods. The operating cash flow ratio (OCFR) increased in the pre-repurchase 
period (from 33.32 percent in year -3 to 43.04 percent in year -1) and then decreased after the 
events to 31.52 percent in year +3. Both the changes in CAPEX and OCFR support the free 
cash flow hypothesis, which suggests that the firms should increase their payout when they 
experience a contraction in their investment opportunity and an increase in their cash flows. 
These findings are consistent with Grullon and Michaely (2003) who found evidence that 
repurchasing firms significantly reduced their capital expenditure and cash reserves following 
the repurchase announcements. The study suggests that the reduction in excess cash and the 
risk of over-investing are sources of the positive market reaction to the repurchase 
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announcements. The leverage ratio (LEV) declined in the pre-repurchase period and 
increased again in the post-repurchase, which implies that firms repurchase stock to increase 
their financial leverage.  Finally, the decline in asset turnover (ATURN) suggests that firms’ 
assets are being deployed less efficiently after repurchases. 
 
5.3.2 Operating Performance Measures Relative to Control Firms 
 
Table 6 reports the median paired differences in the operating performance measures along 
with the non-parametric Wilcoxon test statistics. It shows that repurchasing firms 
outperformed non-repurchasing firms in all the performance measures except for capital 
expenditure. Return on assets (ROA) was significantly higher for repurchasing firms relative 
to the control sample in most of the years except for year +3. However, the return declined 
from the pre- to post-repurchase period. Capital expenditure (CAPEX) was lower for 
repurchasing firms relative to the control sample in the pre-repurchase period and higher in 
the post-repurchase period. The negative sign in the pre-repurchase period indicates that 
repurchasing firms had lower investment opportunities relative to their control firms before 
repurchases were made and these investment opportunities increased after the repurchases. 
However, the value was not significant. Operating cash flow ratio (OCFR) was significantly 
higher for repurchasing firms relative to the control sample in both the pre- and post- 
repurchase periods. This is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis that firms with 
higher levels of excess cash are more likely to make repurchases to minimize the free cash 
flow problem and thus reduce the agency costs. Repurchasing firms’ abnormal asset turnover 
(ATURN) declined from the pre- to post-repurchase periods. This suggests that firms’ assets 
were being deployed less efficiently relative to their control firms after repurchases.  
 
5.3.3 Regression Analysis of Operating Performance Measures Relative to Control 
Firms 
 
Table 7 shows the results from the univariate regressions for each performance measure by 
regressing the median value in the post-repurchase period on its median value in the pre-
repurchase period. The focus of this analysis was the intercept term. A non-zero intercept 
term would indicate that actual repurchases had an impact on the operating performance 
measure. The negative impact on return on assets (ROA) and operating cash flow ratio 
(OCFR) was -1.1 percent (significant at the 10 percent level) and -3.9 percent (not 
significant) respectively. The improvement in capital expenditure (CAPEX) after repurchases 
was 0.8 percent relative to the control sample and was significant at the five percent level. 
This is consistent with Lamba and Luan (2004) who found an improvement in repurchasing 
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firms’ capital expenditure relative to their control sample. There was no significant impact on 
the firms’ leverage (LEV) and asset turnover (ATURN). 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This study examined the firms’ share price and operating performance surrounding actual 
share repurchases in the Hong Kong stock market. In addition, this study also examined the 
motivations behind share repurchases. The empirical results show that, on average, firms 
engage in share repurchases when their stock are under-valued and repurchases are followed 
by positive abnormal return. Among repurchases, the stock price performance varies across 
firms size and market-to-book ratios. The market responds most favorably to repurchases that 
are made by small and value firms. In addition, our results also show that repurchasing firms 
were experiencing an abnormally high level of cash flow and contraction in investment 
opportunities during the years preceding the share repurchases.   
 
These results support the undervaluation hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis. The 
undervaluation hypothesis argues that share repurchases send a signal to the market that the 
firm is under-valued and the market responds positively after the information is revealed. 
Alternatively, the free cash flow hypothesis argues that firms with excess cash and poor 
investment opportunities will face the risk of over-investing if the excess cash is not 
distributed to shareholders. Share repurchases allow firms to distribute the excess cash and 
reduce agency costs and thus increase shareholders’ wealth.  
 
We found no evidence of “earning” signalling hypothesis and leverage hypothesis. Results 
show that there was no significant improvement in the repurchasing firms’ earning 
performance and no increase in financial leverage. These suggest that changing capital 
structure is not the motivation behind open market repurchases. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for open market share repurchase activities in Hong Kong 
from November 1991 (when share repurchase was first allowed in Hong Kong, to the end of 
December 2001).  
 
  
Number of companies 294 
Total number of daily repurchases 9512 
Total number of repurchase events3 2046 
Total number of shares repurchased 6,478,048,189  
Total dollar value of share repurchases 18,624,996,190  
  
 
NOTE: A period of 13 months between 1 October 1997 and 31 October, 1998 is excluded from the sample 
period due to the possibly confounding effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The sample consists of all 
open-market share repurchases that were made by all listed firms during the sample period. 
                                                 
3 Only the first repurchase day is defined as an event when a firm makes multiple repurchases within a month.  
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Figure 1: Total number of shares repurchased and total value of share repurchased during 
1991-2001.  
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Table 3: Abnormal share price performance surrounding the actual open-market share 
repurchases in Hong Kong.  (Panel A: CARs of Full Sample, Panel B: CARs of Size Quartile, 
Panel C: CARs of MTBR Quartile) 
 
   Window 
   (-20,-1) (0,2) (1,20) 
 
Panel A:                                 Full Sample 
      
CAR   -0.8677 % 0.3932 % 0.8827 % 
   (-2.883)*** (2.426)** (3.051)*** 
      
Panel B:                                 Size Quartile 
      
CAR  1 (Small) -0.0111 % 0.5177 % 2.2488 % 
   (-0.016) (1.388) (3.307)*** 
      
CAR  2 -0.6983 % 0.3305 % 0.9587 % 
   (-1.162) (1.094) (1.782)* 
      
CAR  3 -1.963 % 0.6641 % 0.8395 % 
   (-3.271)*** (2.027)** (1.432) 
      
CAR  4 (Large) -0.798 % 0.0602 % -0.5157 % 
   (-1.523) (0.209) (-1.064) 
      
F-test   F = 1.815 F = 0.646 F = 3.840*** 
Panel C:                               MTBR Quartile 
      
CAR  1 (Low) -0.9606 % 0.9312 % 2.9224 % 
   (-1.531) (2.617)*** (4.582)*** 
      
CAR  2 -1.2481 % 0.7014 % 0.0360 % 
   (-2.027)** (1.938)* (0.06) 
      
CAR  3 -0.9885 % 0.4290 % 1.0114 % 
   (-1.693)* (1.234) (1.628) 
      
CAR  4 (High) -1.0739 % 0.0620 % -0.5011 % 
   (-1.572) (0.173) (-0.77) 
      
F-test   F = 0.042 F = 1.110 F = 5.804*** 
      
NOTE: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) were measured relative to the market model. The numbers in the 
main entry are the mean of CARs for various event windows. The numbers in parentheses are the associated t-
statistics: *Significant at 0.10 level, ** Significant at 0.05 level, *** Significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 4: Abnormal share price performance surrounding the actual open-market share 
repurchases in Hong Kong disaggregated by industry.  
 
 N Window 
INDUSTRY  (-20,-1) (0,2) (1,20) 
     
AUTOMOBILE 2 -10.7634 % 2.6617 % -9.8665 % 
  (-1.710) (47.574)** (-1.69) 
     
BANKS 6 0.9016 % -0.5170 % 1.3924 % 
  (0.217) (-0.672) (0.549) 
     
BEVERAGES 5 -0.4690 % -0.2433 % 0.8496 % 
  (-0.239) (-0.199) (0.299) 
     
CHEMICALS 13 -0.3312 % -0.0284 % 4.5821 % 
  (-0.091) (-0.024) (1.869)* 
     
CONSTRUCTION 61 -3.7198 % 0.1748 % 1.8248 % 
  (-2.264)** (0.199) (1.291) 
     
DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRY 34 1.1080 % -0.7045 % -0.3748 % 
  (0.644) (-0.711) (-0.265) 
     
ELECTRICITY 7 -1.8990 % 0.3506 % 0.96 % 
  (-1.515) (0.328) (0.335) 
     
ELECTRONIC & ELECTRIC 76 -0.928 % 0.4057 % 3.0197 % 
  (-0.787) (0.542) (1.586) 
     
ENGINEERING 49 -1.8537 % 1.2670 % -0.7197 % 
  (-1.381) (1.486) (-0.394) 
     
FOOD PRODUCERS 26 -0.0272 % 1.2879 % 2.9648 % 
  (-0.012) (1.016) (1.224) 
     
FORESTRY & PAPER 27 -0.7176 % 0.2905 % 1.8694 % 
  (-0.426) (0.429) (0.954) 
     
HOUSEHOLD GOODS 277 0.0037 % 0.5277 % 0.3792 % 
  (0.006) (1.371) (0.577) 
     
I.T. HARDWARE 36 -1.8618 % -1.3116 % -0.9100 % 
  (-0.581) (-1.421) (-0.413) 
     
INVESTMENT 121 0.6141 % -0.0095 % 1.0627 % 
  (0.708) (-0.021) (1.246) 
     
LEISURE & HOTELS 62 -0.6208 % 0.3545 % 0.2494 % 
  (-0.785) (0.929) (0.295) 
     
MEDIA  ENTERTAINMENT 19 -0.8283 % 1.5101 % 1.2895 % 
  (-0.27) (0.614) (0.561) 
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OIL & GAS 12 2.7313 % 3.8814 % 3.3186 % 
  (0.553) (1.902)* (0.812) 
     
OTHER UTILITIES 17 0.9010 % -0.6558 % -0.8579 % 
  (0.875) (-1.404) (-0.989) 
     
PERSONAL CARE 4 0.7853 % 6.5310 % 6.1161 % 
  (0.149) (5.72)** (1.577) 
     
REAL ESTATE 185 -2.1808 % 0.2465 % 0.4252 % 
  (-3.200)*** (0.658) (0.730) 
     
RETAILERS 98 -1.2159 % 0.4363 % 1.6170 % 
  (-1.034) (0.562) (1.507) 
     
SOFTWARE 23 1.9941 % 0.8706 % 1.0675 % 
  (0.879) (0.644) (0.408) 
     
FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 50 -1.7646 % 1.6977 % 4.236 % 
  (-0.857) (1.934)* (2.288)** 
     
STELL & OTHER METALS 24 -6.2372 % -0.2392 % -0.6169 % 
  (-2.265)** (-0.366) (-0.440) 
     
SUPPORT SERVICES 5 -1.4871 % -0.0278 % -5.8135 % 
  (-0.441) (-0.013) (-3.437)** 
     
TELECOM SERVICES 17 -3.5455 % 2.2175 % 1.5122 % 
  (-1.235) (1.219) (0.681) 
     
TRANSPORT 49 -0.2667 % 0.6367 % 0.2810 % 
  (-0.225) (1.137) (0.248) 
     
F-test  F = 0.975 F = 0.968 F = 0.897 
     
 
NOTE: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) were measured relative to the market model. The numbers in the 
main entry are the mean of CARs for various event windows. The numbers in parentheses are the associated t-
statistics: *Significant at 0.10 level, ** Significant at 0.05 level, *** Significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 5: Median operating performance measures surrounding actual share repurchases 
during 1991-2001 (Year 0 is the year of repurchase). 
 
Year ROA CAPEX OCFR LEV ATURN 
      
-3 6.89 % 3.88 % 33.32 % 29.34 % 102.15 % 
-2 6.51 % 3.58 % 38.73 % 28.92 % 113.77 % 
-1 5.60 % 3.17 % 43.04 % 22.36 % 104.67 % 
0 4.10 % 2.90 % 29.96 % 23.14 % 103.19 % 
1 3.20 % 2.90 % 33.54 % 25.69 % 93.93 % 
2 2.71 % 2.28 % 31.57 % 26.83 % 92.19 % 
3 2.40 % 2.25 % 31.52 % 25.71 % 93.36 % 
      
 
NOTE: The operating performance measures are defined as follows: ROA is the return on assets defined as the 
operating profit divided by the book value of total assets. OCFR is the ratio of the operating cash flow divided 
by the total current liabilities. LEV is the leverage ratio defined as the debt divided by the equity. CAPEX is the 
capital expenditure ratio defined as the total capital expenditure divided by the total book value of assets. 
ATURN is the asset turnover defined as the total sales divided by the total assets employed.  
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Table 6: Median operating performance measures relative to control sample for share 
repurchases during 1991-2001 along with the non-parametric Wilcoxon test statistics. 
 
Year ROA CAPEX OCFR LEV ATURN 
      
-3 2.57 % -1.24 % 13.63 % 5.14 % 14.49 % 
 (-3.571)*** (-1.708)* (-3.055)*** (-0.87) (-3.788)*** 
      
-2 2.66 % -0.31 % 22.53 % 2.77 % 14.87 % 
 (-4.680)*** (-1.186) (-3.503)*** (-0.77) (-3.918)*** 
      
-1 2.29 % -0.27 % 23.19 % 1.01 % 9.77 % 
 (-4.811)*** (-0.551) (-3.667)*** (-0.943) (-2.855)*** 
      
0 1.64 % 0.00 % 15.35 % 2.00 % 6.74 % 
 (-3.632)*** (-0.103) (-2.597)*** (-1.17) (-2.869)*** 
      
1 1.30 % 0.05 % 10.60 % 1.29 % 5.14 % 
 (-2.467)** (-1.128) (-1.518) (-0.947) (-2.545)** 
      
2 0.21 % 0.16 % 6.71 % 1.04 % 6.70 % 
 (-1.761)* (-1.823)* (-1.914)* (-0.263) (-2.324)** 
      
3 -0.05 % 0.18 % 14.07 % 2.12 % 5.25 % 
 (-1.210) (-2.435)** (-1.594) (-1.302) (-2.54)** 
      
 
NOTE: Sample firms are matched with control firms on the basis of industry, size and market-to-book ratio. 
Results shown are for the median paired differences for each variable. The operating performance measures are 
defined in Table 4.5. The numbers in the parentheses are the associated t-statistics. 
*Significant at 0.10 level  
** Significant at 0.05 level 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 7: Results from univariate regressions for operating performance measures relative 
to control sample for actual share repurchases during 1991-2001 (by regressing the median 
value in the post-repurchase on its median value in the pre-repurchase). 
 
Variable Intercept Coefficient R2 F-Statistic 
     
ROA -0.011 0.476   
 (-1.87)* (13.691)*** R2 = 0.503 F = 187.456*** 
     
CAPEX 0.008 0.165   
 (2.492)** (3.743)*** R2 = 0.064 F = 14.010*** 
     
OCFR -0.039 0.75   
 (-0.58) (5.58)*** R2 = 0.215 F = 31.142*** 
     
LEV -1.595 0.375   
 (-0.359) (4.853)*** R2 = 0.104 F = 23.556** 
     
ATURN -0.087 0.765   
 (-1.168) (20.718)*** R2 = 0.692 F = 429.218*** 
     
 
The table reports regression results of the form: 
      iii PREBUYPOSTBUY εφδ ++=  
where POSTBUY represents the paired difference of median post-repurchase values of a variable and PREBUY 
represents the paired difference of median pre-repurchase values of a variable. The intercept, iδ  is a constant 
term that captures the impact of the repurchase on operating performance, while the slope coefficient, iφ  
captures the possible trend from the pre-repurchase to post-repurchase periods. The pre-repurchase period 
covers years -3 through -1 and the post-repurchase period covers years +1 through +3, where year 0 is the year 
of repurchase. The numbers in the parentheses are the associated t-statistics. 
*Significant at 0.10 level  
** Significant at 0.05 level 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
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